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STATEMENT OF INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE 
 Amici curiae are academics who have studied and written about gene patent 
law and policy.  Chris Holman has a PhD in molecular biology and is currently a 
law professor.  In 2007 he conducted a comprehensive study of human gene patent 
litigation that resulted in three published articles on the subject. He has published 
numerous articles relating to the intersection of patent law and biotechnology, and 
is the author of a widely read blog dedicated to biotechnology patent law 
(Holman's Biotech IP Blog).  Robert Cook-Deegan directs the Center for Public 
Genomics, which conducted eight case studies of the impact of patenting and 
licensing on genetic testing for ten clinical conditions commissioned by the US 
Secretary’s Advisory Committee for Genetics, Health and Society, published in 
April 2010, and several other articles arising in this research.  That research was 
supported by a center grant from the National Human Genome Research Institute 
and US Department of Energy.1 
 Affiliations of amici are provided in Appendix A solely for the purpose of 
identification. No part of this brief was authored by counsel for any party, person, 
or organization besides amici.  Our sole interest in this case is maintenance and 
development of a sensible patent system that accomplishes the constitutional goal 
of “promot[ing] the Progress of Science and useful Arts,” particularly in the area of 
                                                 
1 A list of publications from that center grant is available at 
http://www.genome.duke.edu/centers/cpg/publications/. 
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genetic diagnostic testing, and more generally in biotechnology and life sciences.  
Counsel of Record Daniel Ravicher and Gregory Castanias have consented to the 
filing of this brief. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In their zeal to address perceived public policy concerns associated with 
Myriad’s gene patents, and more particularly Myriad’s controversial business and 
patent enforcement practices, plaintiffs have invoked the recently re-invigorated 
patent eligibility doctrine in a manner that threatens to wreak substantial collateral 
damage on future innovation in genetic diagnostic testing, personalized medicine, 
and biotechnology in general. DNA patents have created incentives critical in 
attracting the substantial investment necessary to fuel the discovery and 
development of life-saving products produced by the biotechnology industry. 
Although plaintiffs have identified numerous potential concerns with gene patents 
in the context of some types of genetic diagnostic testing, to date there is 
insufficient evidence that harms attributable to patents on genes justify broad, 
subject matter-based invalidation of all patents made of or based on DNA.  More 
appropriate and targeted legal and policy solutions to problems associated with 
some gene patents and patent enforcement practices are preferable to the blunt 
doctrinal instrument of patent eligibility. The decision below should be reversed in 
order to prevent substantial unintended negative consequences for innovation in 
this increasingly important technology sector, and to enable adjudication of 
patentability using other tools that are more appropriate to the task. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. Introduction 
Plaintiffs object to Myriad's patents, and especially to some of Myriad’s 
patent enforcement and business practices, arguably with some justification. Amici 
do not express an opinion with respect to the ultimate validity of the challenged 
patent claims, nor to the propriety of Myriad's business practices. Unfortunately, 
however, in their zeal to eradicate what they perceive to be a significant public 
health concern, plaintiffs have chosen a strategy which implicates not only Myriad 
and its patents, but if successful would invalidate, or at the very least cast 
substantial doubt upon, a host of patents claiming gene-based inventions, often 
referred to as "gene patents" and indeed many other technologies based on making 
and analyzing DNA. If affirmed on appeal, the decision below could have 
substantial negative implications for future developments in genetics and 
biotechnology. 
This court has substantial discretion under applicable Supreme Court 
precedent to interpret and implement the patent eligibility doctrine in a manner that 
fosters innovation, and does not prematurely preclude the availability of adequate 
patent protection for nascent, information-based technologies. As correctly noted 
by the Patent Office in its recently published Interim Guidance for Determining 
Subject Matter Eligibility for Process Claims in View of Bilski V. Kappos, in most 
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cases issues of claim validity are better addressed using more targeted and well-
established doctrines of patent law. Federal Register Vol. 75, No. 143, 43922, July 
27. 2010 (“examiners should avoid focusing on issues of patent-eligibility under § 
101 to the detriment of considering an application for compliance with the 
requirements of §§ 102, 103, and 112, and should avoid treating an application 
solely on the basis of patent-eligibility under § 101 except in the most extreme 
cases.”)  We do not believe this is such an extreme case.  We urge this court to 
refrain from interpreting the patent eligibility doctrine in a manner that broadly 
implicates the validity of a host of important patents, based on concerns that could 
be more surgically and appropriately addressed with other patent law doctrines, or 
legal and policy solutions addressing problematic enforcement practices rather than 
DNA patents in general. 
II. Gene patents have for years played an important role in incentivizing  
innovation in applied genetics and biotechnology 
 
The USPTO has a long-standing policy of sanctioning gene patents of the 
type at issue in this case, and has issued thousands of such patents over a period 
extending more than 30 years. Kyle Jensen & Fiona Murray, Intellectual Property 
Landscape of the Human Genome, 310 SCIENCE 239 (2005); Georgetown DNA 
Patent Database, http://dnapatents.georgetown.edu/  Gene patents constitute the 
core intellectual property platform for companies dedicated to translating the fruits 
of biomedical research into life-saving therapeutic and diagnostic agents.  They 
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have played a critical role in providing innovators with a sufficient period of 
market exclusivity to recoup the sizable investment necessary to develop and 
secure marketing approval for biotechnology products. J.H. Graham et al., High 
Technology Entrepreneurs and the Patent System:  Results of the 2008 Berkeley 
Patent Survey, 24 Berkeley Technology Law Journal 1255 (2010). 
In Europe, gene patents have been more controversial than in the US, but the 
debate ultimately has been resolved in favor of gene patents.  The European Union 
issued a Biotechnology Directive in 1998 requiring member countries to permit 
gene patents. Directive 98/44/EC of the European Parliament on the Legal 
Protection of Biotechnological Inventions.  Some European countries have limited 
the scope and/or enforceability of these patents to a greater extent than the United 
States, but all currently permit gene patents. Notably, gene patents directed 
towards the BRCA genes associated with inherited risk of breast and ovarian 
cancer recently were found valid after being challenged in opposition proceedings 
in the European Patent Office, although the scope of these claims appears narrower 
than initially granted and than some of the US claims at issue in this case. Case T 
1213/ 05 The University of Utah Research Foundation Et al. (2007) , Case T 
0080/05 The University of Utah Research Foundation Et al. (2008), and Case T 
0666/05 The University of Utah Research Foundation Et al. (2008). Many of these 
issued European claims would appear to be patent ineligible under the decision 
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below.  Thus, affirmance of the decision would cause US patent law to diverge 
from European law with respect to this important class of patents. 
In biotechnology, gene patents often serve as the same function as drug 
patents in the traditional pharmaceutical industry.  For example, a comprehensive 
study of gene patent litigation conducted by one of the authors of this brief in 2007 
(the "Holman study") concluded that most instances of human gene patent 
infringement litigation have involved an innovator biotechnology company 
enforcing its patent against a direct competitor in order to maintain market 
exclusivity for a biologic drug developed by the patent owner. Christopher M. 
Holman, The Impact of Human Gene Patents on Innovation and Access: A Survey 
of Human Gene Patent Litigation, 76 UMKC L. REV. 295 (2007).  Two 
authoritative reports from the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment and 
a 2009 report issued by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) concluded that gene 
patents have provided the “fuel” for the “R&D engine" bringing biologic drugs to 
patients. Commercial Biotechnology: An International Analysis (Washington, D. 
C.: U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, OTA-BA-218, January 
1984); U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Biotechnology in a 
Global Economy, OTA-BA-494 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing 
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Office, October 1991); Emerging Healthcare Issues: Follow-On Biologic Drug 
Competition, Federal Trade Commission Report (June 2009).2   
One of the important products of biotechnology, for example, is recombinant 
erythropoietin, a biologic drug first brought to the market in the 1980s by Amgen 
under the trade name Epogen. Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 706 F. Supp. 94, 
104 (D. Mass. 1989). Recombinant erythropoietin was the product of 
groundbreaking research conducted by Amgen, which required a substantial 
investment of capital. Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., Not Reported in F. 
Supp., 1989 WL 169006, at *7-*18. However, erythropoietin is a naturally 
occurring human protein that was isolated prior to Amgen's work, and the patent 
claiming isolated erythropoietin protein per se expired around the time Amgen 
entered the market with its recombinant product. As a consequence, Amgen has 
relied primarily on gene patent protection to protect its product. For example, when 
another biotechnology company attempted to bring a competing erythropoietin 
product to market in the US, Amgen successfully sued, using its patent claiming 
the erythropoietin gene. Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1212-
14. (Fed. Cir. 1991).  Significantly, Amgen's core patent claim directed toward the 
gene, which this court held infringed and not invalid in Chugai, is almost identical 
                                                 
2 Although the FTC Report does not specifically identify "gene patents" as the 
primary "fuel,” every example cited in the report of a biologic innovator 
successfully asserting its patent against a competitor involved a gene patent. FTC 
Report at 37. 
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to some of the composition of matter claims invalidated in the decision below 
(particularly the first two claims of US patent 5,747,282; the ‘282 patent).3 
III. Gene patents have not been shown to create public policy concerns so 
substantial or pervasive that they would warrant invocation of the 
doctrinal sledgehammer of patent ineligibility 
 
Initially, much of the concern over gene patents was based on a fear that 
they would create a “patent anticommons” that would impede biomedical research. 
Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The 
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCI. 698 (1998).  However, after more 
than a decade it is becoming increasingly apparent that the feared anticommons has 
for the most part failed to materialize, at least in noncommercial, academic 
research.  For example, the Holman study of human gene patent litigation did not 
identify a single instance in which basic research activities or noncommercial 
genetic diagnostic testing led to a patent infringement lawsuit.4  Likewise, surveys 
have shown that researchers, particularly basic and academic researchers, routinely 
ignore patents, and that patents have had little if any limiting effect on their 
research. See generally John P. Walsh et al., Effects of Research Tool Patents and 
                                                 
3 US Patent Number 4,703,008, Claim 2 ("A purified and isolated DNA sequence 
consisting essentially of a DNA sequence encoding human erythropoietin."). 
4 Myriad did sue the University of Pennsylvania for infringement of BRCA gene 
patents, but the university was reportedly charging $1900 for performing the 
BRCA tests. 
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Licensing on Biomedical Innovation, in PATENTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED 
ECONOMY 285-340 (Wesley M. Cohen & Stephen A. Merrill eds., 2003). 
DNA hybridization array technologies, as exemplified by the Affymetrix 
gene chip and Illumina bead arrays, provide a compelling example of how research 
has progressed apace despite fears that gene patent thickets might hinder their use. 
Hybridization arrays have been commercialized and widely used in basic and 
commercial biomedical research and diagnostics since the early 1990s, and for 
many years academics have pointed to hybridization arrays as a poster child for the 
patent thicket. John H. Barton, Emerging Patent Issues in Genomic Diagnostics, 24 
NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 939 (2006).  Hybridization arrays can involve the use of 
polynucleotide representing many thousands of genes in a single product, and it 
was thought that with so many issued gene patents it would be prohibitively 
burdensome to obtain licenses or patent clearance to make or use the arrays. 
In fact, however, the Holman study found that hybridization array 
technology has never been the subject of a patent infringement lawsuit involving a 
gene patent.  Hybridization arrays have generated copious patent litigation – 
Affymetrix, Illumina and other companies have been involved in many patent 
infringement cases - but these lawsuits have involved patents directed towards 
various other technologies used in hybridization arrays, not gene patents. 
11 
 
There are many possible explanations for the lack of human gene patent 
litigation over hybridization arrays, but the lack of effective remedies for the gene 
patent owner could be part of it. Under the eBay standard, it seems unlikely that a 
court would issue an injunction stopping the use of a product or service involving 
many thousands of genes based on the infringement of patents claiming one or a 
few of those genes, particularly if the product or service were serving an important 
public health function. eBay v. Mercexchange, 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
This would leave the award of money damages as the remedy for a 
prevailing patent owner. Under either a lost profits or reasonable royalty analysis, 
infringement of a gene patent by a hybridization array containing polynucleotides 
representing many thousands of genes should result in a modest award of damages 
to the owner of a patent on just one or a few of those genes.  Most concerns about 
the negative impact of gene patents are based on an assumption that patents are 
always enforced, but experience with hybridization arrays illustrates that there are 
practical constraints on injudicious patent enforcement. 
Today, most of the angst over gene patents centers around their potential 
negative effect on genetic diagnostic testing. The recently released Revised Draft 
Report on Gene Patents and Licensing Practices and Their Impact on Patient 
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Access to Genetic Tests (the SACGHS Report),5 for example, identifies a potential 
for a substantial negative impact of gene patents on genetic diagnostic testing, but 
concludes that there is currently no conclusive evidence establishing that gene 
patents have had a net negative impact on the availability of genetic testing 
services.  Many gene patents are non-exclusively licensed for use in genetic 
diagnostic testing, thus permitting competing clinical laboratories to offer the test. 
Some patent owners such as Myriad retain exclusive control in the US, but the 
SACGHS Report did not identify any instance where patents caused a test to be 
entirely unavailable to patients for a prolonged period of time (case studies 
referenced in the report did reveal problems, but not pervasive, system-wide harm). 
It is important to recognize that the SACGHS Report addresses two distinct 
forms of restrictions on access.  There are restrictions on the ability of competing 
commercial diagnostic testing laboratories to offer tests on a particular gene owing 
to the patent owner’s exclusive licensing practices, and there are restrictions on the 
ability of patients and healthcare providers to obtain testing on a desired gene.  The 
two should not be conflated - restrictions the ability of competing laboratories to 
provide the test without licensing the patents does not necessarily imply that 
patients and healthcare providers are unable to obtain the testing they desire.  
                                                 
5 Available at 
http://oba.od.nih.gov/oba/SACGHS/SACGHS%20Patents%20Report%20Approve
d%202-5-20010.pdf. 
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For example, Myriad’s assertion of exclusive rights to perform BRCA 
testing has caused some competing laboratories to exit the US market, but there is 
no clear evidence that this has resulted in less patients being tested in the US. To 
the contrary, as exclusive provider in the US Myriad has invested substantially in 
facilitating insurance reimbursement and in promoting awareness of BRCA testing, 
which arguably has resulted in more individuals being tested for BRCA mutations 
in the US than would have been the case otherwise.  Indeed, one concern raised in 
the case studies was overutilization of BRCA tests SACGHS case study. 
Similarly, SACGHS looked for evidence that patent-based exclusivity 
resulted in higher costs for genetic testing services, but was unable to document 
any consistent effect.  The SACGHS Report states that “[O]ne surprising finding 
from the case studies was that the per-unit price of the full-sequence BRCA test, 
which often is cited as being priced very high, was actually quite comparable to the 
price of other full-sequence test done by polymerase chain reaction (PCR), at both 
nonprofit and for-profit testing laboratories." 
To date, there has been little patent litigation involving gene patents and 
genetic diagnostic testing. The Holman study identified several instances in which 
lawsuits have been filed asserting human gene patents against a provider of genetic 
diagnostic testing services, but in every case the parties settled quickly. Until the 
decision below, it appears that no court had ever addressed substantive issues of 
14 
 
patent validity or claim scope with respect to a gene patent asserted in the context 
of diagnostic testing.  Thus, providers of genetic diagnostic testing services have 
never attempted to challenge human gene patents on more conventional grounds, 
such as noninfringement or invalidity under section 102, 103 or 112, and so it is 
premature to assume that these less sweeping patent challenges would be 
ineffective to deal with the policy concerns alleged by plaintiffs with respect to the 
patent claims at issue. 
IV. Concerns raised with respect to Myriad's patents, and gene patents 
in general, could be better addressed using other doctrines of 
patentability and appropriate claim interpretation 
 
Plaintiffs assert that at the time Myriad identified and characterized the 
BRCA genes, the existence of the genes was well known and multiple laboratories 
were actively engaged in efforts to isolate and sequence the genes. They argue that 
it was inevitable that one of these laboratories would have succeeded, and thus 
BRCA genetic testing would have been made available regardless of Myriad's 
contribution. The decision below states that "the consensus among the scientific 
community” is that Myriad was not the first to sequence the BRCA2 gene. 
In essence, statements such as these question the inventiveness of Myriad’s 
claimed compositions and methods. But the appropriate legal doctrines for 
addressing these concerns are novelty and nonobviousness, not patent eligibility. If 
the allegations are accurate, and at the time of Myriad's invention there was 
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widespread knowledge that the BRCA genes existed, motivation to isolate them, 
and methods for isolating and sequencing the gene with a reasonable likelihood of 
success were available, recent case law suggests that the patent claims could have 
been invalidated for obviousness under Section 103 of the patent statute. KSR 
International Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 US 398 (2007); In re Kubin, 561 F.3d 1351 
(Fed. Cir. 2009). And if in fact the “consensus” is correct that others had succeeded 
in isolating the BRCA2 gene prior to Myriad, the novelty requirement under 
Section 102 is likewise implicated. 
The policy advantage of using the nonobviousness and novelty requirements 
to address these concerns, rather than patent ineligibility, lies in the ability of these 
doctrines to distinguish between new and nonobvious inventions warranting patent 
protection, and non-inventions that are either anticipated by the prior art, or which 
would have been obvious to those skilled in the art at the time of the invention.  
Plaintiffs also argue that challenged claims are overly broad, completely 
blocking the ability of others to perform any sort of genetic testing, or to perform 
research, and even preventing doctors from communicating with their patients. In 
so doing, they (like many critics of gene patents) fail to heed the most fundamental 
maxim of patent law, to wit, "the name of the game is the claim."6  Some of those 
claims may be invalid.  Or when properly interpreted, at least some of the 
                                                 
6 Quoting Judge Giles S. Rich. 
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challenged claims likely would likely not have the broad preclusive effect that 
plaintiffs attribute to them.   
For example, the product claims reciting the full-length BRCA coding 
sequence would not appear to be infringed by conventional BRCA mutation testing 
as it is currently practiced, which involves the amplification and sequencing of 
relatively short fragments of the full-length gene sequence. Robert Cook-Deegan et 
al., Impact of gene patents and licensing practices on access to genetic testing for 
inherited susceptibility to cancer: comparing breast and ovarian cancers with 
colon cancers, 12 Genetics in Medicine S15 (2010). Since the full-length BRCA 
coding sequence is not made or used in the process of diagnostic sequencing, it is 
hard to see how infringement could be shown for these claims. 
Some of the other challenged claims appear broader on their face, and more 
likely to be infringed by conventional genetic diagnostic testing, but that does not 
necessarily mean these claims are valid, or could not be circumvented by future 
technological advances in DNA analysis and diagnostic technology. To date there 
have been no judicial decisions addressing the interpretation and scope of human 
gene patent claims in the context of genetic testing, so it is difficult to predict how 
expansive the scope of these claims would be once they emerge from the crucible 
of patent litigation. 
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However, in the context of biologic drugs, human gene patents have been 
litigated extensively on a number of occasions, and there have been multiple 
instances in which an alleged infringer successfully designed around a human gene 
patent that on first inspection might have appeared quite broad. Christopher M. 
Holman, Learning from Litigation: What Can Lawsuits Teach Us About the Role of 
Human Gene Patents in Research and Innovation? 18 Kansas Journal of Law & 
Public Policy 215, 223-29 (2009) (examples discussed include Genzyme v. 
Transkaryotic Therapies, 346 F.3d 1094 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (claims broadly reciting 
methods for recombinant production of human α-galactosidase A not infringed by 
method employing gene activation technology); Regents of University of 
California v. Eli Lilly, 119 F.3d. 1559, 1571-74 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (patent on insulin 
gene circumvented by expressing protein as a fusion); Novo Nordisk v. Genentech, 
77 F.3d 1364, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (apparently broad gene patent circumvented 
by the use of protein fusion technology); Berlex v. Biogen Laboratories, 318 F.3d 
1132 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (claims to cells that have been genetically engineered to 
express the human interferon gene not literally infringed by cells produced using 
alternate transformation method); Schering v. Amgen, 222 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 
2000) (patent claiming naturally occurring interferon gene not infringed by 
consensus interferon product). 
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All of Myriad's composition of matter claims recite isolated polynucleotides 
(i.e., DNA and/or RNA molecules).  It is not a foregone conclusion that these 
claims would necessarily cover any and all technologies that could be used to 
perform BRCA diagnostic testing. For example, this court recently held that 
diagnostic testing procedure that employs peptide nucleic acids (PNAs), which are 
synthetic, non-naturally occurring DNA analogs, did not literally infringe a method 
claim reciting the use of "nucleic acids," because PNA is not a nucleic acid. 
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Dakocytomation, 517 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2008).  
PNAs can substitute for DNA molecules in at least some diagnostic applications, 
and in some respects perform better than their naturally occurring DNA 
counterparts.7  This example is provided not to suggest that Myriad's composition 
of matter claims could necessarily be circumvented by use of synthetic DNA 
molecules, but it illustrates that claims to isolated polynucleotides are not 
necessarily impervious to being designed around in the context of diagnostic 
testing. 
Similarly, it is not clear that all formats of genetic diagnostic testing 
necessarily require the making or using of "isolated" DNA molecules in the way 
                                                 
7Petra P. Paulasova & Franck Pellestor, The Peptide Nucleic Acids (PNAs): A New 
Generation of Probes for Genetic and Cytogenetic Analyses, 47 ANNALS DE 
GÉNÉTIQUE 349 (2004), available at 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/sites/entrez?cmd=Retrieve&db=pubmed&dopt=Abstr
act&list_uids=15581832. 
19 
 
courts might interpret the term.  There is no definitive case law on the question of 
exactly how "isolated" should be interpreted in diagnostics.  Does “isolated” apply 
to “copied as found in nature” or not? Some assume that a claim reciting an 
isolated DNA molecule should be interpreted as broadly encompassing the DNA in 
any context outside its native context in the human body. However, there is reason 
to think that if the issue were litigated, a narrower interpretation might be imposed. 
For example, a 2002 district court decision seems to imply (without addressing the 
issue head-on) that a claim to an isolated DNA molecule does not cover 
recombinant cells genetically engineered by the introduction of a plasmid 
containing the claimed DNA molecule. Synaptic Pharmaceuticals Corp. v. MDS 
Panlabs, 265 F.Supp.2d 452 (D.N.J. 2002).  Claims on “isolated” DNA might 
require some transformation from DNA as found in nature, or a functional change, 
but such case law interpretations would leave some DNA inventions patentable.  If 
DNA is ruled to be patent-ineligible per se, such case law cannot develop. 
Some whole genome sequencing technologies currently in development 
rapidly scan a single molecule of DNA in order to determine its sequence.  Kevin 
Davies, THE $1000 GENOME (New York:Free Press 2010).  It is not clear whether 
or not these technologies involve the making or using of "isolated" DNA molecules 
as that term is properly interpreted in the context of issued human gene patents. If 
“isolated” is so expansive that full-genome sequencing infringes thousands of 
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individual gene claims, then a serious patent thicket could arise.  Yet case law 
could narrow the scope of “isolated” under existing patent doctrines without 
invoking patent-eligibility. 
It is important to bear in mind that the broader the term "isolated" is 
interpreted, the more vulnerable the claim is to validity challenges under Sections 
102, 103 and 112.  The broader the scope of a patent claim, the more susceptible it 
is to invalidation for violating one of the requirements of patentability. See Giles S. 
Rich, The Proposed Patent Legislation: Some Comments, 35 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 
641, 644 (1967) (explaining that “the stronger a patent the weaker it is and the 
weaker a patent the stronger it is.”).   
Some of the claims at issue in the case below might illustrate this principle. 
Claim 5 of US patent number 5,747,282, for example, recites any “isolated DNA 
having at least 15 nucleotides of the [full length BRCA-encoding DNA 
sequence].” In principle, fragment claims such as this provide much broader 
coverage than claims reciting full-length genes, and would appear to encompass 
conventional BRCA mutation testing that involves the amplification and analysis 
of DNA fragments as used in diagnostic testing.  If the claim is interpreted that 
broadly, however, it raises significant validity issues. 
In particular, a recent study found that 80% of the cDNA and mRNA 
sequences that were contributed to GenBank (and hence presumably published) 
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before the effective filing date of the ‘282 patent contain at least one DNA 
fragment falling within the scope of Claim 5, and thus would apparently be 
encompassed by the claim. Thomas B. Kepler, Colin Crossman and Robert Cook-
Deegan, Metastasizing patent claims on BRCA1, Genomics (2010), 
doi:10.1016/j.ygeno.2010.03.003.   Follow-up studies have shown many “hits” of 
15-mer sequences in GenBank sequences that had already been deposited more 
than a year before patent application, thus implicating 35 USC 102(b). It thus 
appears that either this claim (and the similar claim 6) is invalid because it is not 
novel, or courts would have to interpret the claim in a narrower sense than 
suggested by a plain reading of the claim language. 
More generally, enablement and written description are the appropriate 
doctrinal tools for challenging overly broad patent claims, not patent eligibility. 
Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (overly broad 
gene patent claim invalidated for lack of enablement); Regents of the University of 
California v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed.Cir.1997)(overly broad gene 
patent claim invalidated for lack of adequate written description). 
Recent lawsuits filed by Ariad Pharmaceuticals against Eli Lilly and Amgen 
exemplify the effective use of limiting claim interpretation and claim invalidation 
under section 112 as alternatives to patent ineligibility.  Eli Lilly attempted to 
invalidate Ariad's claims by arguing they are patent ineligible, but ultimately 
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succeeded in obtaining the same result using the written description requirement. 
Ariad Pharmaceuticals v. Eli Lilly, 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir 2010). Amgen, on the 
other hand, avoided liability by successfully arguing that the claims when properly 
construed do not cover their allegedly infringing products. Amgen v. Ariad 
Pharmaceuticals, 333 Fed.Appx. 549 (Fed. Cir 2009).  In both cases, conventional 
patent doctrine was sufficient to fend off Ariad's allegations of infringement, 
without slamming the gate on patent eligibility. 
Arguably, some of the claims at issue in the case below exceed a scope that 
is commensurate with the nature of the inventors’ contribution to the art. One of 
the broadest claims among the contested patents is claim 1 of US Patent 5,753,441, 
which on its face appears to encompass the identification of any difference 
between a sample sequence and a standard (normal or "wild type") reference 
sequence for BRCA1. While it is true that the inventors identified the genes’ 
location and some disease-associated variations, many of the more than 2000 
known BRCA variants, some of which confer cancer risk and some of which do 
not, were only identified after Myriad applied for these patents. The claim would 
appear to encompass the detection of any variation, even variations that were not 
known to be associated with disease at the time of the invention. Even in 2010--
that is, 16 years after gene discovery and 12 years after patent grant—some BRCA 
tests are reported as "variants of unknown significance,” i.e., the clinical 
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implications of the genetic variation are unknown. The scope of the claim appears 
on its face to include not only the variants known to confer risk, and disclosed in 
the patent, but also gives exclusive rights to detect any variants of the gene 
including those discovered since and yet to be discovered, regardless of clinical or 
scientific utility. 
To its credit, Myriad has tracked the clinical significance newly discovered 
variants it finds.8 But it is clear that the clinical significance of such variants has 
required hard work over a decade and a half by Myriad and many other clinical 
researchers; and this important task remains incomplete. Myriad may well have 
invented a genetic test for inherited risk of breast and ovarian cancer, but Myriad’s 
patents arguably claim more than they invented.  A careful claim-by-claim review 
of those patents could restrict their patent exclusivity to the scope of their actual 
invention.  This kind of review would narrow the scope of the patents without 
endangering patents on genes that enable production of valuable therapeutic 
proteins, vaccines, and other useful molecules.  Yet case law cannot determine 
proper claim scope if no claims on DNA are allowed at all. 
Properly drafted and interpreted, gene patent claims should not have the 
broad inhibitory effect on access and innovation asserted by the critics.  The 
remedy to unduly broad scope is invalidation based on insufficient enablement or 
                                                 
8 Cook-Deegan, DeRienzo, et al. 2010. 
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inadequate written description, not a blanket prohibition on the patenting of 
anything made of or based on DNA.  Once again, these other doctrines of 
patentability can limit gene-based patent claims to an appropriate scope, rather 
than using the patent eligibility doctrine that would unnecessarily invalidate all 
DNA-based patents indiscriminately and regardless of their merit. 
V. Concerns with Myriad’s patent enforcement and business practices 
could be better addressed by other means 
 
Most of the current anxiety surrounding gene patents in general, and 
Myriad's patents in particular, centers around their potential negative impact on 
genetic diagnostic testing and research. The extent of the problem is currently 
unclear and the subject of much debate. However, if society determines that the 
business and enforcement practices of some gene patent owners is problematic in 
some contexts, it would be more appropriate to consider alternatives that more 
directly address the enforcement concerns, rather than interpreting patent eligibility 
in a manner that broadly precludes effective patent protection for DNA-based 
inventions in general. 
For example, since the real concern with gene patents is the potential for 
restrictions on research and genetic testing, a more targeted approach could involve 
the creation of some sort of limitation on infringement liability for those using 
patented genetic technology in research or genetic testing. This was the 
recommendation of the SACGHS Report.  Along similar lines, the Genomic 
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Research and Diagnostic Accessibility Act, introduced in Congress in 2002 but 
never enacted, would have amended the patent statute to eliminate liability for use 
of certain patented genetic technologies in basic research and diagnostic testing. 
Genomic Research and Diagnostic Accessibility Act of 2002, H.R. 3967, 107th 
Cong. (2002).  In fact, the patent statute already contains a provision that shields 
healthcare providers from liability for acts of patent infringement occurring during 
the performance of "medical activities."  35 USC 287(c).  If Congress concludes 
that gene patents do pose a threat to genetic testing, the statutory safe harbor could 
be expanded to explicitly encompass providers of genetic diagnostic testing 
services. 
If necessary, other approaches such as compulsory licensing, invocation of 
march-in rights, and assertion of state sovereign immunity could be considered. 
Joshua D. Sarnoff & Christopher M. Holman, Recent Developments Affecting the 
Enforcement, Procurement, and Licensing of Research Tool Patents, 23 Berkeley 
Tech. L.J. 1299 (2008).  These approaches would be extreme, and would not 
appear to be justified at the present time, but are available should some gene patent 
enforcement practices prove to be as deleterious to the public interest as plaintiffs 
allege in this case. 
International experience with BRCA testing reinforces this point.  Myriad 
has established a de facto BRCA testing monopoly in only one jurisdiction, the 
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United States.  In the United Kingdom, the National Health Service rebuffed 
Myriad’s business plan.  Shobita Parthasarathy. 2007. Building Genetic Medicine: 
Breast Cancer, Technology, and the Comparative Politics of Health Care. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.  In Canada, Australia, and Europe Myriad has not 
become the sole provider of even first-line BRCA testing.  E. Richard Gold and 
Julia Carbone. 2010. Myriad Genetics: in the eye of the policy storm. Genetics in. 
Medicine. 12 Supplement (April): S39–S70.  This suggests that what most 
distinguishes the United States from other countries is not the strength of its patent 
system but the weakness and inaction of other stakeholders in the US health 
system. 
The National Institutes of Health, as a partial funder of this research, has 
rights in the inventions through both the Stevenson-Wydler and Bayh-Dole Acts, 
and under Bayh-Dole has authority to march in if “health and safety needs” are not 
met by the patent holder.  The government pays for almost half of health services 
through Medicare, Medicaid, the Veterans Health Administration, Indian Health 
Service, military health system, Tricare, and Federal Employee Health Benefits 
plan.  And private payers can condition coverage and reimbursement decisions on 
compliance with business practices to promote access to tests and interpretation of 
their results.  Experience in the rest of the world suggests that to the extent there 
are problems with Myriad’s business practices, the remedy can be found in 
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awakening US agencies and institutions from their stupor rather than foregoing the 
patent incentive for all inventions based on DNA. 
Some have expressed concern that Myriad has leveraged its patent-based 
status as exclusive BRCA testing provider in the US to amass a proprietary 
database of sequence variants associated with cancer risk that could serve to 
maintain market dominance, even after the relevant patents have expired. 
Clinicians rely on this information to interpret test results. Until November 2004, 
Myriad was a major contributor to public databases of BRCA mutations.  But since 
25 November 2004, Myriad has not shared data on mutations they discover, or 
about their clinical significance except through selective publication. 
The practical consequence is that clients sending samples to Myriad can 
benefit from its proprietary database of mutations and clinical findings, while 
others cannot. In effect, Myriad could leverage its US patent exclusivity—which 
makes it the largest BRCA testing service in the world—into a permanent 
proprietary database.  Interpreting the clinical significance of variants characterized 
since Myriad stopped sharing data with public databases will depend on either 
Myriad’s sharing them or on others replicating the work that Myriad used its US 
sole provider status to develop. 
But it is important to bear in mind that using patent exclusivity to leverage 
other forms of exclusivity is not unique to diagnostics, and there are mechanisms 
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for dealing with it. For example, anticompetitive business practices used to 
maintain a monopoly are more properly addressed by the antitrust laws.  There are 
also potential market-based solutions. For example, as noted above, most genetic 
diagnostic testing is paid for by third-party providers, including the US 
government.  Payers can demand that Myriad share data if interpreting test results 
depends on such sharing. 
VI. The lower court's invalidation of claim 20 of the ’282 patent 
illustrates the problem with using patent eligibility to address a 
perceived problem with gene patents 
 
Claim 20 of the ‘282 patent covers what is commonly referred to as a cell-
based assay, used to identify potential drugs for the treatment of cancer. The 
claimed method involves substantial human intervention, including genetic 
engineering of a recombinant cell culture to express a BRCA variant, and use of 
the resulting cell culture in a laboratory screening procedure to identify 
pharmaceutically active chemical compounds. 
Nonetheless, the decision below invalidated this claim for patent 
ineligibility. If this claim is patent ineligible, it is hard to imagine a biotechnology 
claim that is eligible for patent protection. This illustrates the unsuitability of 
patent eligibility for distinguishing between patentable an unpatentable 
biotechnology inventions, and the danger of unintended negative consequences for 
biotechnology if the decision below is affirmed. 
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VII. Affirmance of the decision below could result in substantial 
unintended consequences impeding the development of future 
genetic diagnostic tests, personalized medicine and biotechnology 
 
Looking forward, companies focused on the development of 
pharmacogenomics and personalized medicine—technologies widely viewed as 
critical to the future of pharmaceutical development and healthcare—point to gene 
patents as critical to securing the funding necessary to bring these products to 
market. See, for example, Amici Curiae briefs filed in the court below on behalf of 
BayBio et al., Genetic Alliance, and the Biotechnology Industry Organization.  
Affirmance of the decision below could dramatically reduce the private incentive 
for investment in innovation in these and related fields. 
The decision below could also undermine incentives for the development of 
new biologics, an increasingly important class of life-saving drugs. As noted 
above, gene patents have historically played a role in providing market exclusivity 
for biologic innovators in the past, and they could be even more important now that 
Congress has created an abbreviated approval process for follow-on biologics. 
Affirmance of the decision below could have an unintended but nonetheless 
substantial negative impact on patent protection to develop these often life-saving 
therapeutic products. 
The availability of patent protection for genetic inventions could become 
more important if the cost of bringing future genetic tests to market increases. 
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Some would argue that gene patents are not required to promote innovation in 
genetic diagnostic testing, based on an assumption that the relevant genes and 
mutations will be discovered with or without the incentive of a patent, and that 
once the genetic variations have been identified and correlated with disease it 
requires little investment to commercialize a genetic test. Given that patent holders 
and those holding exclusive licensing to first-generation diagnostic gene patents 
were rarely “first to market,” this argument might be valid with respect to the 
BRCA genes and other single genes highly correlated with disease. Cho M, 
Illangasekare S, Weaver M, Leonard, D,Merz J. 2003. Effects of patents and 
licenses on provision of clinical genetic testing services. J. Mol. Diagnostics 
5(1):3–8; see also the eight case studies of ten clinical conditions prepared for the 
Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Genetics, Health and Society and published in 
a supplement to Genetic in Medicine (April 2010), in which none of the companies 
that patented or exclusively licensed gene patents for Mendelian medical 
conditions was first to market.  It does not follow, however, that publicly funded 
research will suffice to discover and develop the next generation of genetic testing 
technologies.  Indeed, the complexity of nascent diagnostics suggests they will be 
expensive to develop. 
Much of the future of genetic testing will lie in identifying more complex 
patterns of genetic variation involving a large number of genes dispersed 
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throughout the genome, or identification of complex gene expression patterns.  
Personalized medicine will involve identifying correlations between genetic 
variation and specific therapeutic compounds. These next-generation diagnostic 
testing products and services might very well require a substantial private 
investment, increasing the importance of the patent incentive. A wholesale 
elimination of patent protection for genetic inventions, as embodied in the decision 
below, could impair future innovation in diagnostics. 
Another factor to be considered is the likelihood that at some point the 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) will take a more active role in regulating 
genetic diagnostic testing, and require a submission of data demonstrating safety 
and efficacy, similar to the current requirements with respect to drugs and medical 
devices.  FDA regulation would substantially increase the investment necessary to 
commercialize new genetic diagnostic tests compared to past genetic tests, and 
patents might be necessary to induce adequate private investment.  Finally, if the 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services or private health plans and insurers 
begin to demand clinical studies before they cover and reimburse for genetic tests, 
development costs would rise dramatically to pay for long-term clinical studies to 
supply evidence of clinical validity and utility. 
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CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, this Court should reverse the district court on its 
determination that the claims at issue are patent ineligible. 
 Respectfully submitted; 
 
            
  Christopher M. Holman 
 
Counsel for AmiciCuriae Christopher 
M. Holman and Robert Cook-Deegan 
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